This collusive price setting behaviour leads, as usual in oligopolies or in this specific case of oligopolists acting like one single monopolist, to a loss in total welfare and in the consumer surplus. At the same time there is an increase in producer surplus because the price in the collusive oligopoly acts like a mark-up on the price-quantity equation of equalising marginal costs with marginal revenues. In figures, the collusive price generates a produce surplus of $4billion in each year, while the loss of the consumers is $7billion in each year (Bresnahan, 1981). The total loss in welfare is over $3billion in each year (Bresnahan, 1981). This figures show that there is a big loss in market efficiency after the introduction of the collusive price by the oligopolists.
If the student has explored all other options and still wish to change supervisors, he or she should talk to the graduate program director. If the supervisor happens to be the graduate program director, the student should talk to the chair of the academic unit. If the student remains uncertain or dissatisfied, he or she should talk to the vice-dean graduate studies of his/her home faculty. Beyond that, the student can talk to the university ombudsperson. The student can request that the exchanges with any or all of these individuals (directors, vice-dean, ombudsperson) remain confidential.